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May 2008
THE SECOND BERLIN WALL
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen
Strategic Studies Institute
The latest contretemps in NATO regarding burden sharing in Afghanistan has the
distinguishing feature of being altogether pedestrian. European reluctance to contribute
more troops and funding to Afghanistan has less to do with disagreements over
strategy than it does with a pattern of behavior stemming back to the birth of the
Alliance.
Few recall the contentious deliberations at the beginning of the Cold War between
the United States and its European allies regarding military contributions to the
Alliance. The Truman administration expected the European powers to reconstitute
their armies once they had recovered economically. But, having little faith in the
American security guarantee, European statesmen refused to raise sufficient forces for
defense without a tangible commitment from the United States. With no movement on
the matter, the United States relented, deploying several divisions to NATO in 1949.
Yet, the European reciprocal pledge did not materialize.
With security assured through collective defense and the U.S. nuclear umbrella,
European states progressively invested in social welfare programs that demanded a
greater portion of gross domestic products (GDP). And social welfare states are
voraciously self-indulgent. During this transformation, an interesting pattern of
behavior manifested. Rather than share collective defense equitably, member states
attempted to shift security burdens subtly to other members. Other than voicing
annoyance, the United States, as a global superpower in a bipolar world, accepted this
behavior because the larger goal of peace in Europe remained intact.
Even had the United States objected to this sort of behavior, what could be done?
Every state west of the Iron Curtain, whether a member of NATO or not, enjoyed the
collective good of security. The United States certainly could not have denied this
security to any particular state. Hence, allied compliance with U.S. security policy
initiatives alternated between acceptance of America’s leadership role and American
use of bargaining (e.g., financial and prestigious incentives). Ultimately, it was easier to
ignore the behavior.
The end of the Cold War held different meanings for both sides of the Atlantic. For
the Europeans, it meant a peace dividend with the inexorable drop in military
expenditures, falling well below 2 percent of GDP. Perhaps this laxness would not have
evolved had the United States withdrawn from NATO as most Realists predicted.

However, the United States, ever fearful of a security dilemma emerging again in
Europe, sought to keep a united Germany subordinated to NATO, while also using the
prospect of NATO membership to moderate the behavior of Central and East European
states. With both policy vectors, the United States was eminently successful, but then,
reacting to questions of NATO’s continued relevance, the Alliance added collective
security missions to its repertoire. Whether the Europeans understood the implications
of collective security or simply went along, never believing in its implementation, is
anyone’s guess.
With the extension of the U.S. security commitment to Europe affirmed, along with
the rise of the European Union (EU) in 1993, there arose among European statesmen a
nontraditional view of foreign and security policy. The centerpiece of this new policy
would rest on international institutions, regimes, and other normative devices to
undergird security and stability. In theory, this approach obviated the need for high
military readiness, which declined precipitously, and permitted even greater budgetary
allocations toward social welfare programs, much to the satisfaction of everyone—
except for the United States.
Much to the chagrin of western European statesmen, Hobbes’ state of nature threw
cold water on the soft power approach in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, requiring
American intervention (under the aegis of NATO) to resolve the conflicts. In response
and with great fanfare, European governments pledged to improve military
capabilities, first with the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC), and, second, by the creation of the EU Rapid Reaction
Force (EURRF) under the EU Headline Goal. Regrettably, European states did not
increase military expenditures to meet the DCI/PCC goals, at least not with any type of
urgency. Contrary to initial lofty pronouncements, the EURRF has not evolved into a
European security pillar. Its offspring, the EU Battle Groups (EUBG), suffer from an
inability to handle large crises and also from a lack of political will to deploy
contingents into dangerous environments. Hence, the European security pillar is little
more than a peacekeeping force with paltry combat capabilities.
The dichotomy between European rhetoric and action regarding Afghanistan is
certainly perplexing. In the wake of 9/11, NATO did provide some assets to Operation
Enduring Freedom under Article V; the coalition in Afghanistan includes many nonNATO nations; and all participating governments agree with the overarching goals for
Afghanistan. Yet, the majority of European governments consistently fail to deliver on
their financial and military pledges, many of which date back to 2003. A plausible
explanation may be that European statesmen are prisoners of their political systems.
Fundamentally, European affinity for extravagant social welfare programs, the
obsession with cutting military spending, and a distinct predilection for peacekeeping
operations are manifestations of European political institutions. Because of their
pluralistic design, parliamentary governments tend to be unduly influenced by the
mercurial passions of the electorate. Moreover, coalition governments, that is,
governments which lack a legislative majority and must form a government with other
political parties, often experience paralysis over contentious issues and can even fall as
a result.
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The security challenges in Afghanistan have become divisive among coalition states
precisely because they expose the old practice of burden shifting and because the
United States uncharacteristically has not backed off its insistence for greater military
contributions. Transatlantic tensions will very likely become intractable. On the one
hand, the old European standbys of claiming overtaxed militaries and implying other
allies are not fulfilling their obligations have become threadbare with the United States.
But on the other hand, populist attitudes that increased military spending to meet new
challenges will threaten cherished social welfare programs appear to have boxed in
European governments. The pawns of these national policies are the armed forces,
which are deployed into theater as a coalition or Alliance balm and not as a force to
render decisive results. Small troop contingents combined with a plethora of national
caveats tend to undercut the theoretical advantages of multilateralism. In Afghanistan’s
case, the sum appears to be smaller than the whole.
The real issue at stake is not whether success or failure in Afghanistan will endanger
the Alliance; rather it is whether the United States will continue to see utility in NATO’s
integrated military structure. NATO as an institution will remain because the United
States sees utility in its continuance. However, in the future, the United States will likely
revert to bilateral negotiations to build coalitions because of the niggard behavior of too
many NATO members. Similar to the first Berlin Wall, today’s metaphorical Berlin Wall
symbolizes the enslavement of statesmen to the social welfare state and weak political
systems. And while future generations will look back and ask why Europe slept when a
challenge grew into a threat, this should be the starting point.
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